Marfinalizing Organized Educators: The Effect of School Choice and \u27No Child Left Behind\u27 on Teacher Unions by Krisbergh, Jonathan P.
MARGINALIZING ORGANIZED EDUCATORS: THE
EFFECT OF SCHOOL CHOICE AND 'No CHILD
LEFT BEHIND' ON TEACHER UNIONS
Jonathan P. Krisbergh*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Our Nation is at risk. . . [T]he educational foundations of our
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that
threatens our very future as a Nation and a people."'
The rhetoric of A Nation at Risk sparked the modem era of education
reform and is one of the "most significant documents in the history of
American public education. 2  In 1983, President Ronald Reagan's
Secretary of Education, Terrel M. Bell, appointed the National Commission
on Excellence in Education 3 with the strange mission to recommend that
the Federal Department of Education be terminated.' Instead, the
Committee's findings and the language used in the report created a
renewed public interest in improving education in the country and an
increased role for government involvement, both at the federal and state
levels.'
In the twenty-two years since A Nation at Risk was released, there is a
feeling that "mediocrity is still on the rise" and that the attempts at
* J.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2006; A.B. Duke
University, 2001. I am extremely grateful for the help and guidance of Lawrence White,
who helped me in the early stages of this project. I would also like to thank my parents, Hal
and Audrey Krisbergh, and my sister Deborah, for their love and support throughout my
entire law school experience.
1. National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative
for Educational Reform (1983) reprinted in 84 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 112, 112 (1983).
2. Edward B. Fiske, 35 Pages that Shook the U.S. Education World, N.Y. TIMES, April
27, 1988, at B10.
3. Paul E. Peterson, Preface to OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE ... ARE WE STILL AT
RISK? at xvii (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003).
4. Helen Ladd, Address at Duke University: Education Policy (Aug. 28, 2000); See
also, Fiske, supra note 2, at B1O (noting that the President's aides were upset because the
report did not recommend the termination of the Federal Department of Education).
5. Ladd, supra note 4.
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"stemming the rising tide" have been unsuccessful. 6 Many believe that
teachers' unions are at the root of the resistance to substantive reforms.
There is a belief in the education community, and indeed in society at large,
that one of the main reasons reforms have not taken hold despite over
twenty years of effort is that the politics of education are biased toward the
status quo. The teachers' unions are now in a defensive mode, having to
battle "potentially crippling legislation" allowing school choice.7 Many
share the concern that:
The only reforms that make it through the political process tend
to be those that are acceptable to the established interests-
particularly the teacher unions-and that leave the fundamentals
and problems of the current system intact. Because of the
political power of the unions, the nation has invested much of its
time, effort, and money in incremental reforms that do little to
improve the schools-but that don't [sic] threaten union interests.
And because of union power, reforms that really can bring about
a transformation-accountability and choice-tend to be
eviscerated in the political process and reduced to pale reflections
of what they could be.8
Despite the negative outlook of some commentators, major reform
efforts have been undertaken in recent years. Both at the state and federal
level of government, systemic reforms have been instituted over the past
decade or so. These include voucher programs, charter schools and the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).9 Much reform has focused on
efforts to increase parental choice as well as student and teacher
accountability. The teachers' unions are being marginalized in the current
education reform debates. Changes brought about by the debates will
continue to erode the effect of the unions. This marginalization is in fact a
goal of many reform efforts. The market-based models of education
reform are aimed at breaking the monopoly of the teachers' unions and
unbinding education from the collective bargaining agreements between
the school administration and the teachers.
While most discussions of education reform focus on state and federal
laws, there is another "set of rules and regulations that significantly affect
what happens in a school each day-the collective bargaining agreements
between school districts and teachers unions."' 0 In this comment, I address
6. Peterson, supra note 3, at xviii.
7. Donald D. Slesnick II & Jennifer K. Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in the Mid-
90s(The 1980s Were Challenging, but This Is Ridiculous)-A Union Perspective, 25 J.L. &
EDUC. 661, 669 (1996).
8. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of the Status Quo, in OUR SCHOOLS OUR FUTURE...
ARE WE STILL AT RISK? 44 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003).
9. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
10. ALEX MEDLER ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TEACHERS UNIONS IN A
MARGINALIZING ORGANIZED EDUCATORS
both the role that the teachers' unions have played in these efforts and
possible implications of education reforms on teacher contracts.
The scope of this comment is twofold: To consider the role teachers'
unions have played in reform movements to elucidate whether the unions
are as entrenched in the status quo as some believe; and to discuss the
implications of these reforms on the future role and power of teachers'
unions in light of the changes that have taken place in public education.
Specifically, these reforms include the increase in school choice, whether
through school voucher initiatives, the advent of public charter schools, or
school accountability regimes such as those required by No Child Left
Behind.
Part II outlines the history of teachers' unions and the statutory basis
for allowing collective action among teachers. Part III discusses specific
provisions of collective bargaining agreements relevant to the discussion of
specific education reforms. In Part IV, the paper looks specifically at three
education reform measures: voucher programs, charter schools, and No
Child Left Behind. The discussion of each includes the background of the
reform, the stance that unions have taken in the policy debates surrounding
the passage of reform, and potential clashes the reform may have with
collective bargaining agreements. Part V concludes with advice that
teachers' unions be included in the discussions of education policy to
prevent both violations with existing collective bargaining agreements and
impasses in future contract negotiations.
II. HISTORY OF UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION
Though the right of teachers to organize was not recognized at the
time, teachers began organizing at the end of the 19th Century. The
National Education Association (NEA) was founded in 1857" and the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was founded in 1916.12 The NEA
and the AFT remain the two major teachers' unions. 3 The first collective
bargaining contract for public school teachers is believed to have been
negotiated in 1944 in Illinois.
14
CHARTER DISTRICT, at ii (2003), available at
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/49/71/4971 .pdf.
11. NEA Fact Sheet, http://www.nea.org/presscenter/neafact.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
12. About AFT: Who We Are, http://www.aft.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
13. BERNADETTE MARCZELY & DAVID W. MARCZELY, HUMAN RESOURCE AND
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 19 (2002).
14. ANTHONY M. CRESSWELL & MICHAEL J. MURPHY, TEACHERS, UNIONS, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 20 (1980).
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While the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) 5 exempts
governmental employees from collective bargaining,1 6 its passage marked
the legitimacy of the practice in the private sector.17 The first state to pass a
bargaining law for the public sector was Wisconsin, and this was not until
1959.18 Federal employees' right to form, join, and assist employee
organizations was recognized by the 1962 Executive Order 10988, issued
by President John F. Kennedy.' 9
Executive Order 10988 sparked similar gains at the state and local
levels. 20  However, until the 1960's, some states prohibited union
membership among their public employees. It was not until a 1967
Supreme Court decision that public employees were guaranteed the right to
organize under their free association rights. 21 The judiciary has continued
to reinforce teachers' constitutional rights to participate fully in union
activities. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the individual's
right to form and join a union is protected by the First Amendment.22
"School officials have been prohibited from imposing sanctions or denying
benefits to discourage protected association rights.,
23
This guaranteed right to organize does not include an inherent right to
bargain collectively. Rather, each state authorizes collective bargaining via
statute.24 Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have authorized
collective bargaining for teachers. 25 By the mid-1980s, eighty-six percent
of the nation's public school teachers bargained collectively.26 Today, the
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000), amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Harley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2000).
16. See, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (listing federal and state governmental entities among those
excluded from the definition of employer in the Act).
17. NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & STEPHEN B. THOMAS,
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS, 437-438 (Arnis E. Burvikovs
ed., Pearson 2004) (1981).
18. CRESSWELL & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 20.
19. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962).
20. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 439.
21. id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
22. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F. 2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1968)).
23. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 439; See also,
Hickman v. Valley Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 619 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1980) (overturning
a school board's dismissal of a teacher because of union activities); Cent. Sch. Dist. 13J v.
Cent. Educ. Ass'n, 962 P.2d 763 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (ruling that a teacher could not be
discharged for exercising association rights protected under state law).
24. In some states, even in the absence of authorizing legislation, the courts have
recognized the legitimacy of contracts which were collectively bargained so long as the
public employer agreed to the terms. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Pub. Employees Council No.
51, 571 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Ky. 1978) (ruling that the public employer "is authorized to
contractually commit itself to a . . . condition of employment with . . . a Union
representative").
25. MARCZELY & MARCZELY, supra note 13, at 18.
26. Id. at 19.
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NEA represents over 2.7 million teachers27 and the AFT represents about
1.3 million members.28
While the majority of states recognize the rights of the teachers to
collectively bargain, they differ in the scope of these rights.29 Many states
have modeled their bargaining statutes after the NLRA, which stipulates
that representatives of the employer and of the employees must confer
"with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment., 30 A few states, such as Iowa, Tennessee, and Nevada deal
directly with the scope of bargaining by identifying each item that must be
negotiated.3 "Some states specify prohibited subjects of bargaining.
32
States limit the scope of collective bargaining rights for public
employees in general and specifically for teachers because the negotiations
inherently include debates over policy decisions. The states that prohibit
collective bargaining for their teachers altogether "view the prospect of
public sector collective bargaining, particularly with teachers, as an
unbalanced power struggle between the bargaining unit and the public
sector employer., 33 Additionally, the limits placed on teachers' rights to
collectively bargain are based on a belief that:
[Alllowing collective bargaining amounts to an illegal delegation
of discretionary governing power to the teachers' union. The
union, a private interest group, becomes a participant in the
school board's legislative process, a public activity, in that the
end effect of collective bargaining requires the public served to
fund the contract developed through taxation and essentially
gives the union an element of control over the fiscal resources of
a community."
There is also concern that because public employees do not operate in
a competitive market, there will be no "curb [on] extravagant bargaining
settlements."35  Whereas in the private sector, competition forces
management to make decisions in negotiations that will permit the
company to remain competitive, the "virtual monopoly" of the teachers'
unions allows them to hold their employer, the government, "hostage., 36 If
27. NEA Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
28. About AFT: Who We Are, supra note 12.
29. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 444.
30. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2002)); See also, MARCZELY & MARCZELY, supra
note 13, at 19 (examining state bargaining requirements).
31. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 444 (citations
omitted).
32. Id.
33. MARCZELY & MARCZELY, supra note 13, at 19.
34. Id. at 22
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id.
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the negotiations reach an impasse, and a strike is imminent, the government
must decide between curtailing the delivery of the public service or
conceding to the union's demands.37 Because of these concerns, state laws
preclude public employers from being forced to negotiate "governmental
policy matters" while allowing negotiations that concern "conditions of
employment., 38 The courts recognize that this line becomes very blurry
when dealing with teachers in the classroom, whose job requires them to
implement policy on a daily basis in teaching the curricula, etc. "Virtually
every managerial decision in some way relates to 'salaries, wages, hours,
and other working conditions,' and is therefore arguably negotiable: yet at
the same time, virtually every such decision also involves educational
policy considerations, and is therefore arguably nonnegotiable.
' 39
"With the possible exception of changes resulting from racial issues,
[the advances made by teachers' unions to organize and collectively
bargain] has been the most fundamental change in K- 12 education in the
latter half of the 20th century., 40 There is a belief in the education and
political communities that unions will "often respond to innovations [and
reform efforts] by characterizing changes as violations of the union
contract."'4 The unions are now politically powerful entities that attract an
increased amount of criticism based on the image of their desire to
maintain the status quo and oppose change. 42  The animosity toward
teachers' unions is expressed by those at the highest levels of education
management across the country. President George W. Bush's first
Secretary of Education, Roderick Paige, said that the NEA was a "terrorist
organization., 43 "Paige's subsequent apology and clarification was [sic]
even more revealing: he emphasized that he had been referring to the
37. Id.
38. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 445-46.
39. MARCZELY & MARCZELY, supra note 13, at 33 (quoting Montgomery County Educ.
Ass'n. v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 534 A.2d 980, 986 (Md. 1987)).
40. Myron Lieberman, M.D., Choice andAction, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 161,
165 (1999-2000).
41. Jennifer L. Hochschild, Comments on James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A
Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 327, 329
(2003-2004) (quoting Timothy Ross, Grassroots Action in East Brooklyn: A Community
Organization Takes Up School Reform, in CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION 118, 127
(Clarence N. Stone ed., 1998)).
42. See, e.g., Robert Holland & Don Soifer, How School Choice Benefits the Urban
Poor, 45 How. L.J. 337, 338 (2002) (arguing that "national teacher unions.., have battled
at every turn to preserve the status quo by spending millions of dollars to mount legal
challenges to any and all experiments."); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption:
A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. &
POL. 539, 599 (2002) ("[T]he unions representing public school teachers ... are politically
influential and deeply hostile to voucher programs.").
43. Amy Goldstein, Paige Calls NEA a 'Terrorist' Group, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004,
at A19.
MARGINALIZING ORGANIZED EDUCATORS
union itself, rather than to the teachers who are its members or to the
profession, and noted that his comments had been provoked by the NEA's
'obstructionist scare tactics' . . ..
III. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
The collective bargaining agreements negotiated between teachers'
unions and the school district board of education govern the terms and
conditions of employment for bargaining unit member employees. Some
contracts include a management provision maintaining policymaking and
management authority of school operations to the school board. The scope
of these responsibilities reserved for the board varies across districts.
However, teacher contracts may contain provisions that state that the
management and control of the school board may be limited by express
clauses in the contract.45 Other contracts do not reserve such powers,
leaving the contract to define the roles of the different players. As districts
begin to experiment with reform efforts, provisions within the contract
contrast with management decisions.
A. Exclusivity
Most collective bargaining statutes provide for the principal of
exclusivity and teacher contracts most likely have a clause stating that the
union representing the teachers is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative for employees and teachers.46 The exclusivity principle
limits the number of organizations that can be recognized as the
representative bargaining unit to one, in this case, the teachers of a
44. Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the 'Un-American' Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1705, 1725 (2004) (quoting Robert Tanner, Education Secretary
Attacks Teachers Union, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Feb. 24, 2004, at 3).
45. See e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School District of
Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, American Federation of
Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO, September 1, 2004 to August 31, 2008, Article II,
http://www.pft.org/contract/contract2000.html (last visited April 10, 2006) (hereinafter
Philadelphia Collective Bargaining Agreement) (stating that management and control is
limited "only to the extent that there is a provision of this Agreement which expressly limits
a management prerogative.").
46. See e.g., Id. at art. III, § A2 (recognizing the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers,
Local 3, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative for all employees); Agreement between The Board of Education of the City
School District of the City of New York and United Federation of Teachers Local 2,
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO covering Teachers, November 16, 2000 to May
31, 2003, art. I, http://www.uft.org/member/rights/contracts/current teachers contract/(last
visited April 10, 2006) (recognizing the United Federation of Teachers Local 2, American
Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of all those
assigned as teachers).
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particular school district.47 This means that the district cannot negotiate a
separate contract with any other organization of teachers or with individual
teachers. Those teachers who choose not to be a part of the union remain
subject to the contract negotiated between the union and the school district.
B. Employment Security: Seniority and Just Cause
Teacher contracts, as they govern the employment relationship, have a
provision dealing with employment security for teachers. The contracts
often provide for decisions regarding placement and reductions in force to
be based on seniority and not on merit or some other performance criteria.48
Importantly, contracts include provisions forbidding the dismissal of a
teacher without just cause. If the district dismisses alleging cause, the
teacher will be afforded certain process rights, including appeal to the
courts.
C. Grievance Procedure
Employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement can seek
remedies for grievances through procedures outlined in the contract for
actions taken by the school district or administration. A grievance can be
filed regarding a dispute or disagreement over the application or
interpretation of the contract. The processes may include review by the
school principal with appeal to the human resources of the school district.
Further appeal can be carried to the state department of education and
eventually to arbitration or to the courts.50
47. DONALD H. WOLLETT, JOSEPH R. GRODIN, & JUNE M. WEISBERGER, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 26-27 (4th ed. 1993).
48. Philadelphia Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 45, at art. IX A.
49. See, e.g., Id. at art. IX C ("[T]he employee affected shall have the option of electing
to proceed under the provision of the Pennsylvania Public School Code .... "); Agreement
Between School District No. 1, Multnomah County Oregon and Portland Association of
Teachers 2004-2006, art. 9 D, http://www.patpdx.org/Contract%202004-2006.pdf ("[A] unit
member having contract status may elect to appeal the dismissal to ... the Fair Dismissal
Appeals Board....").
50. Philadelphia Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 45, at Article XV B.
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Vouchers
1. Background
Vouchers are grants of money that are given to parents that apply
toward the cost of tuition at schools other than their geographically
assigned public school. They can be applied to other public schools,
charter schools, and to private schools.5' The voucher concept is rooted in
free-market principles of giving parents the choice of where their children
are educated, with the idea that such choice will force school improvement
to compete for students.52
Voucher programs were not widely introduced until the 1990s. 3
Currently, there are about eighty private voucher programs serving more
than 60,000 children around the country.54 The vouchers usually can be
used at both religiously affiliated schools and secular schools. Though the
dollar amount varies from program to program, the amount is usually not
enough to cover the entire cost of tuition.55
There are very few publicly funded voucher programs. Proposed
voucher programs were rejected in a number of states including California,
Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and Michigan.5 6 The organized resistance
continues to be effective in curtailing efforts to publicly fund vouchers.
Despite the many successful blocks to voucher programs, Congress passed
the first federally funded school voucher program on January 22, 2004,
allocating $14 million to establish a program for low-income students in
the District of Columbia.57
One of the most controversial aspects of voucher programs is that they
allow public money to be given to religious institutions, via religious
schools. This is an important issue because most private schools in this
country are religious schools.58 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, decided in
June 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an Ohio voucher program for
51. MARTIN PATCHEN, MAKING OUR SCHOOLS MORE EFFECTIVE: WHAT MATTERS AND
WHAT WORKS 250 (Charles C. Thomas Pub., 2004).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 251.
56. Id.
57. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. c, tit. I, 118 Stat.
3, 117 (2004).
58. PATCHEN, supra note 51, at 250.
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Cleveland school children is constitutional and does not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment even though it allowed
parents to use the vouchers for religious schools. 9
Zelman established the legality of vouchers being used for religious
school tuition without violating the federal constitution.6" Challenges based
on state constitutionality continue. For example, a Florida court recently
ruled that the state's voucher program violated the state constitution
because it permitted payment to religious schools. 61 However, "the U.S.
Supreme Court decision [in Zelman] means that the question of vouchers
becomes one of 'Is this a good idea?' rather than 'Is this legal?' in much of
the United States. 62
2. Union Stance
School vouchers are one of the most contentious methods of school
reform because they permit public money to go to private institutions.
Many fear that vouchers represent a significant step to completely abandon
public education in favor of a private system.63 The teachers' unions are
"some of the most vocal critics" of vouchers. 64 "Teachers' unions 'put
vouchers in a different category from virtually all other issues in the
politics of education reform. Vouchers are public enemy number one, as
they see it, and must be defeated at all costs.' ' 6 5 The Wall Street Journal
reported that the NEA raised its dues specifically to help fund anti-voucher
efforts.66
The unions continue to fight a multi-front assault on vouchers.
They have taken the fight to the courts, the legislatures, and before the
court of public opinion to defeat ballot initiatives. 67  Even after the
59. 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
60. Id.
61. Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
62. PATCHEN, supra note 51, at 251.
63. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1233 (2003) (citing Dorothy Shields, Cartoon Helped Show Us
School Voucher Problems, PANTAGRAPH A13 (Feb. 18, 2001)).
64. Richard S. Albright, Educational Voucher Statutes: Does the Rosenberger Analysis
Provide a Modern Constitutional Foundation for Legitimacy?, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
525, 530 (1997).
65. Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 163, 168 n.21 (2002) (quoting TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC 26 (2001)).
66. Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for Sectarian Schools After Zelman:
Will the First Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts Constitution?, 193
ED. LAW REP. 343, 349 (2005).
67. Id. (pointing to a press release issued by the NEA, stating that the organization
would continue to fight vouchers "at the ballot box, in state legislatures, and in state
courts.") (citations omitted).
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significant defeat in Zelman, the teachers' unions were adamant about their
stance against vouchers. Both the NEA and the AFT "vowed to oppose
voucher programs by every means available to them."68
The unions help to finance anti-voucher litigation. Unions were
involved in the Zelman case, they "were central actors in the Milwaukee
voucher" litigation, and they played a role in Bush v. Holmes.69 Public
opinion was also persuaded by the efforts of the teachers' unions. By
disseminating information that vouchers were bad policy, the unions helped
to defeat most initiatives in state legislatures to publicly fund vouchers.7 °
3. Going Forward: Clashes with Collective Bargaining Agreements
One of the major premises behind the pro-voucher movement is to
create an educational marketplace, which will increase competition for
students among schools.71  Along the continuum of school-choice
programs, vouchers represent the most extreme move in the direction
toward the privatization of education. Voucher systems pose a threat to the
bargaining power teachers' unions currently enjoy.72 Such initiatives may
"subject[] [teachers] to the open marketplace, leading to reductions in
salaries and benefits.
7 3
There may be conflicts with voucher programs and collective
bargaining agreements. While this issue has not been litigated, unless
collective bargaining agreements are renegotiated after a publicly funded
voucher law is passed, voucher programs may lead to violations of the
contract. The principle of exclusive representation, as discussed above,
stands contrary to a school district's siphoning money to private schools
and their teachers. Teachers in private schools for which the vouchers are
used are not subject to the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by
the union representing the teachers in the school district.
Enabling the school districts to out-source teaching may also represent
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. A union could file a
grievance for unfair labor practices if a school begins to replace teachers
subject to the collective bargaining agreement with teachers in private
68. Id.
69. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 955 n.177
(2003).
70. Allen M. Brabender, The Crumbling Wall and Free Competition: Formula for
Success in America's Schools, 79 N.D. L. REV. 11, 14 (2003).
71. Albright, supra note 64, at 529.
72. Id. at 530 n.28.
73. Id. at 530 (quoting Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional
Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423, 428 (1995)).
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schools who are not subject to the agreement. 74  In order to begin
appropriating money to a private school, a school district would have to
address provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Teachers'
unions view privatization as a direct threat to their existing collective
bargaining agreements.75  Voucher programs could lead to "scenarios in
which teachers lose the right to bargain collectively, in which their
membership in a bargaining unit becomes voluntary, where they are forced
to become part of a separate bargaining unit, or where they lose rights of
transfer.,
76
The state legislatures, in enacting voucher legislation, are unable to
supersede existing collective bargaining agreements. Article 1, section 10,
clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall ...
pass any ... law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 77 In order for the
legislature to override an existing contract with teachers, the law would
have to withstand judicial scrutiny under a standard of "reasonable and
necessary" for an "important public purpose., 78 Therefore, unless a new
agreement is negotiated after the passage of legislation authorizing a
publicly funded voucher program which includes language allowing for
teachers to work outside of the negotiated contract, any such use of
vouchers could lead to arbitration and litigation over the payment of funds
to private schools.
79
74. See, e.g., James G. Cibulka, The NEA and School Choice, in CONFLICTING
MISSIONS?: TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 155 (Tom Loveless ed.,
Brookings Inst. Press 2000) (explaining that teachers' unions oppose choice programs which
allow the transfer of students out of the public school district because such programs lead to
"revenue declines for districts that suffer a net loss of resident pupils" which leads to the
loss of teaching jobs).
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id. at 161.
77. U.S.CONST.art. 1,§ 10, cl.1.
78. Alan Miles Ruben, The Top Ten Judicial Decisions Affecting Labor Relations in
Public Education During the Decade of the 1990's: The Verdict of Quiescent Years, 30 J.L.
& EDUC. 247, 248 (2001) (citing United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
21(1977))
79. However, districts may argue that the scope of the collective bargaining agreement
does not extend to "policy" decisions such as the use of vouchers to attend private schools.
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 69, at 934 (noting the "policy impetus for school vouchers").
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B. Charter Schools
1. Background
A second and more prevalent type of school choice program is the
charter school. Charter schools are publicly funded schools that "operate
autonomously from the district administration. '8 °  Charter school laws
differ among states, but they generally allow private groups to seek a
charter to operate a school. Groups who have started charters include
parents, teachers, community organizations, universities, and private profit-
making firms." Each state delegates charter-granting authority to different
groups, including the local school district, a community college or
university, or the state department of education.82
The charter school movement has spread across the country since the
first charter school law was passed by Minnesota in 1991." Today, there
are more than 3,000 charter schools in operation in 41 states and the
District of Columbia.84 Charter schools are less controversial than voucher
programs because charter schools are, by definition, public schools and
cannot be religiously affiliated. Proponents of charter schools view
charter schools as a way to increase market competition which will in turn
be a way to "weaken teacher unions. 86  Liberal supporters of charter
schools believe that the charter movement is a compromise with voucher
proponents and will remove pressure for full privatization.87
There have been unsuccessful challenges to state charter school laws.
80. PATCHEN, supra note 51, at 237.
81. Id.
82. State ex rel. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Williamson, 141 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004).
83. PATCHEN, supra note 51, at 237.
84. Center for Education Reform, Charter Law,
http://www.edreform.con/index.cfn?fuseAction=cLaw (last visited April 10, 2006).
85. Although religious groups can apply for a charter, the established school cannot
have a religious affiliation. See, e.g., Edith & Eloise Acad. v. Steel Valley & Pittsburgh
School Dist., Docket No. CAB 2001-7, Pennsylvania (2001) (holding that a charter
applicant and sectarian body must not be so entangled that the operations are merged.). If
an applicant is a religious group, a charter may not be granted to it. Because the charter
school will receive financial and in-kind aid from a sectarian school and church, it does not
meet the requirements of the Chart School Law, which provides that no regional charter
school shall be established or funded by a sectarian school, institution or other entity. The
proposed Charter School would not be nonsectarian in all operations, in violation of the
Chart School Law.
86. David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the Schoolhouse:
How Legislatures and Courts Shaped Labor Relations for Public Education Employees
During the Last Decade, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 290 (2001).
87. Id.
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For example, the Michigan courts ruled that the charter law did not violate
the state constitution. The plaintiffs:
[A]ssert[ed] that the system established by our Legislature
violates art. 8, rsection] 2 [of the state constitution] because
public school academies are not public, 1) in that they are not
under the ultimate and immediate, or exclusive, control of the
state and 2) because the academy's board of directors is not
publicly elected or appointed by a public body.ss
The court held for the state, finding that the constitution required the state
to "support" education and that there was no constitutional requirement for
"exclusive control."8 9 Further, the court said that the authorizing process in
the granting of the charter was a sufficient amount of control over "public
school academies." 90
2. Union Stance
While the teachers' unions are in unanimous opposition to school
vouchers, the unions do not all share the same views of charter schools.
Both major unions are suspicious that charter school laws are "designed to
blunt or even bust union influence over education."91  However, Albert
Shanker, the famed leader of the AFT, was actually one of the original
proponents of charter schools.92
The NEA, while supporting the idea of charters, is concerned that the
charter laws do not consistently require accountability and that teachers
hired by the charters are not as qualified as those in the public school
system.93 Though originally championed by their president, the charter
movement has received more criticism from the AFT, which continues to
view the charter movement as "a form of privatization and/or contracting
out."' 94 The AFT argues that allowing public money to fund charter schools
amounts to "awarding of franchises to private firms to operate government
88. Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. about Parochiaid, Inc. v. Governor, 566
N.W.2d 208, 216 (Mich. 1997) (citations omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes that
Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 349, 377 n.216 (2003).
92. Judith Johnson & Alex Medler, The Conceptual and Practical Development of
Charter Schools, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 291, 292 (2000); Press Release, American
Federation of Teachers, First-Ever NAEP Charter School Results Repeatedly Delayed
http://www.aft.org/presscenter/releases/2004/081704.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
93. R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Past and Future Trends Affecting K-12 Employment
Relations: A Management Perspective, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 227, 238 (2001).
94. Id.
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facilities." 95 To the public, the image remains that the unions are strictly
opposed to charter schools, despite the support they have shown. 96
Teachers' unions use their political force to shape the strength of
charter school laws when the states are considering such a law. 97 A weak
charter school law makes it more difficult for a group seeking a charter to
receive the grant. This may be done by limiting the granting authority to
the local education agency-that is, the school district-which stands to
lose students if the charter is granted or by raising the requirements for a
charter grant.9
3. Going Forward: Clashes with Collective Bargaining Agreements
Charter school laws have an interesting interplay with teacher
contracts. A majority of the charter laws allows teachers to decide how
they will be represented in negotiations with the charter school.99 In these
states, teachers can opt into the collective bargaining agreement with the
school district or they can negotiate separately. 00 In the minority of states,
the charter law does not allow the teachers in the charter school to negotiate
a separate contract with the charter school. Instead the law requires the
teachers to remain part of the district's collective bargaining agreement.101
Like vouchers, charter schools represent a break in the monopolistic power
of the teachers' unions. In the states where charter school teachers can
organize separately from district representatives, different policies for the
charter teachers may violate the district contract and lead to grievances for
unfair labor practices. Only about one quarter of charter school teachers
belonged to unions in 2002 and a smaller number were hired subject to a
collective bargaining agreement. 1 2  However, the NEA has begun amovement to organize charter school teachers and the number of
95. Id. (citing American Federations of Teachers, AFT On The Issues, available at
http://www.aft.org (last visited April 10, 2006)).
96. See, e.g., Neal R. Pierce, Charter Schools-and Those Who Resist Them, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 6, 1996, at 1 A (arguing that "in state after state... teacher unions are trying to quash
charters.").
97. Kathryn Kraft, Cyber Charter Schools-An Analysis of Their Legality, 56 SMU L.
REv. 2327, 2337 (2003).
98. Id. at 2336-37.
99. Dave A. DeSchryver, Center for Education Reform, The Real Unions: Leaders Try
Rhetoric and Legislation to Stop Charters,
http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=document&documentlD=193 (last visited
April 10, 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Caroline Hendrie, Calif. Union to Organize in Charters, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 14,
2004, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/04/14/31chartunion.h23.html (last visited
April 10, 2006).
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represented teachers will likely increase in the years to come. 103 To the
extent that charters are "separate legal educational corporations that act
independently of a school district,"'' " the payment of district money to
charter school teachers could be seen as a contracting-out of government
services.
The conflicts with the teacher contract can be numerous and can
lead to a virtual paralysis of charter school management. One principal
commented that he was "grieved for every single article in the contract" for
violations. 10 5 The charter was forced to negotiate waivers from the district
collective bargaining agreement.'06
One major area of conflict charters face is the seniority-based hiring
system required by most teacher contracts. Under this system, the charter
is unable to freely choose which teachers it hires, as the schools are forced
to accept teachers who can transfer in from other schools because of their
seniority.'0 7 Most charters view the ability to freely hire and fire teachers
as essential to improving student achievement and encouraging teacher
innovation.'08 In order for a charter to have such freedom, waivers from the
teacher contract must be secured or an entirely new contract that included
an exemption for teachers in charter schools would have to be negotiated.'0 9
An interesting strategy used by charter schools to get the teachers to part
with the job security ensured by traditional contracts is to offer teachers
more decision-making input.110
In addition to conflicts with those charter school teachers whose
contract is part of the school district's agreement, similar challenges that
face voucher programs may trouble charter schools. The district is
effectively subverting the teacher contract by providing money to other
schools and teachers to educate the children outside of the contract
negotiated by the union and school district. The school district, in allowing
the charter to negotiate a different contract with its teachers, is authorizing
103. Id.
104. Int. High Sch.: A Charter Sch. at LaGuardia Cmty. Coll. v. Mills, 715 N.Y.S.2d
490, 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
105. Caroline Hendrie, supra note 102 (quoting Dennis Mah, the principal of
Sacramento's first charter school).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Alex Medler, Educ. Comm. of the States, Collective Bargaining and Teachers
Unions in a Charter District, at ii (2003), available at
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/49/71/4971.pdf.; See also, Linda Perlstein, Montgomery
Considers Charter School, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2003, at B01 (stating that though the
Maryland charter school law allows for different arrangements for charter school teachers,
"[s]ide agreements would have to be negotiated with the teachers union to make possible a
school with longer schedules and a different protocol for hiring and firing.").
110. Medler, supra note 109, at ii.
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a private entity to negotiate with public funds. As discussed above, this
may not be a violation of state constitutional requirements, but may be a
violation of the exclusive right of the teachers being paid by the district to
work subject to the collective bargaining agreement.
The General Accounting Office "found that nearly all states provided
'flexibility by releasing charter schools from some traditional public school
requirements, such as teacher hiring and termination practices, schedules,
and collective bargaining agreements...'' . Though these laws have not
been challenged as violations of the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution, 12 the fact that the states are abrogating contracts agreed to by
teachers and their employers may be a source of future litigation.
C. No Child Left Behind
1. Background
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)" 3 marked a dramatic
change in the federal government's role in education. The federal
government first became involved in educational policy in the early 20th
century and mainly focused on helping to fund the construction of school
facilities. 
114
In 1958, Congress committed the first substantial amount of federal
money to public education." 5 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),' 16 which remains
the major piece of legislation granting federal money to states to
supplement educational spending.1 7  Title I of the ESEA provides the
largest amount of money to the states and is aimed at providing money "for
educationally deprived schoolchildren.""' 8 Today, federal funding accounts
for about eight percent of education expenditures. "9 The ESEA has been
subject to several reauthorizations, the most recent of which was NCLB.
120
111. GAO Issues Report on Charter Schools, US FED NEWS, Jan. 13, 2005, at 1, 1.
112. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
113. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
114. Lawrence White, Chief Counsel, Pa. Dept. of Educ., Address at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, The Basics of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Jan. 31,
2005).
115. Id. at 2 (citing The National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 401 (2005)).
116. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.).
117. White, supra note 114, at 4.
118. Id.
119. U.S. Department of Education, 10 Facts About K-12 Education Funding,
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/1Ofacts/index.html (last visited April 10, 2006).
120. White, supra note 114, at 4-8.
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An underlying theme of NCLB is to "afford choice to the parents of
students in schools perceived.., to be failing or on the verge of failure."''
The accountability provisions of NCLB require that each state
measure student achievement and that each school meet certain academic
benchmarks, referred to as Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). 112 Schools
that fail to meet AYP goals are subject to "corrective action" which the
school must follow to achieve "school improvement.' 23 The severity of
the corrective action increases every year that the school fails to meet AYP.
This ranges from the provision of technical assistance to replacing school
staff, extending the school day or year, or even completely closing the
school and reopening it as a charter school.
24
2. Union Stance
The major unions do not support NCLB, although they subscribe to
the goals of the legislation. 25  The NEA argues that NCLB creates
obstacles to improving student achievement and objects specifically to the
focus on "punishments rather than assistance, mandates rather than support
for effective programs and privatization rather than teacher-led, family-
oriented solutions."' 126 The AFT is less critical of the law, although it too
expresses reservations about NCLB and the implementation of NCLB's
provisions. 27  The AFT was optimistic when the law was passed and
remains committed to the accountability requirements of the law.
2
1
121. Id. at 9 (citing U.S. Department of Education, Office of Innovation and
Improvement, Choices for Parents, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/choice/index.html (last visited
April 10, 2006)); see also U.S. Department of Education, Office of Innovation and
Improvement, Creating Strong District School Choice Programs (May 2004),
http://www.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/choiceprograms/index.html (last visited April 10,
2006) (discussing the steps to take in providing school choice to parents).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(2)(B) (2001).
123. White, supra note 114 (citing NCLB § 11 16(b)(7), 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7) (2001)).
124. NCLB §§ 11 16(b)(7)-(8) 20 U.S.C. §§ 6316(b)(7)-(8) (2001).
125. National Education Association, 'No Child Left Behind' Act/ESEA,
http://www.nea.org/esea/more.html (last visited April 10, 2006).
126. Id.
127. American Federation of Teachers, NCLB-Let's Get It Right,
http://www.aft.org/topics/nclb/index.htm (last visited April 10, 2006).
128. Id.
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3. Going Forward: Clashes with Collective Bargaining Agreements
NCLB's impact on collective bargaining agreements remains unclear.
Teacher contracts may completely take the teeth out of the law and remove
much of the accountability envisioned by its drafters and proponents.
Section 11 16(d) of the law provides that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or otherwise
affect the rights, remedies, and procedures afforded school or
school district employees under Federal, State, or local laws
(including applicable regulations or court orders) or under the
terms of collective bargaining agreements, memoranda of
understanding, or other agreements between such employees and
their employers. 
129
Given this provision, the ability of a local education agency or a state to
implement the corrective actions required in section 1116 is called into
serious question. For example, collective bargaining agreements may
contain provisions which state that:
1. If a school fails to make AYP for four consecutive years, and
is placed in the "first year of corrective action," the district shall
not replace or transfer staff that have been deemed relevant to
failure under AYP.
2. The employer shall not extend the employee's school day or
school year except by mutual agreement of the parties. 3 0
These proposals are problematic because they eliminate two of the
corrective actions available under NCLB in sections 11 16(b)(7) and (8).''
NCLB allows a teacher in a school which fails to meet AYP for four
consecutive years to be removed, despite the fact that the teacher faces no
individual charges of misconduct or other cause for dismissal. These
removal provisions run headlong into the teacher contract and the just
cause provision discussed above.'32 If teachers were removed under the
corrective action provisions of NLCB they could file a grievance for
violation of their contract and, pursuant to 1116(d),'33 would be likely to
win.
129. NCLB § 1116(d), 20 U.S.C. § 6316(d) (2001) (emphasis added).
130. Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Bargaining Over P134 & No Child Left
Behind, 6, available at http://www.wasb.org/employee/2004_PI34NCLB.pdf (last visited
April 10, 2006).
131. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6316(b)(7)-(8) (2001).
132. Se, e.g, Catherine Gewertz, Collective Bargaining Bumping Up Against No Child
Left Behind Law, EDUC. WEEK, September 8, 2004, at 1 available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/09/08/02philly.h24.html (last visited April 10,
2006) (discussing issues concerning compliance with NCLB and teachers' collective
bargaining agreements that outline the ways in which teachers are to be hired).
133. 20 U.S.C. §6316(d) (2001).
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Existing contracts which conflict with NCLB would thus trump the
law. However, the question remains as to what contracts negotiated after
the law became effective will look like. There is an "ongoing debate about
whether districts will need to seek changes in collective bargaining
agreements to comply with No Child Left Behind Law."'
134
The U.S. Department of Education hopes local officials "uphold the
content and spirit" of NCLB in the contracts they negotiate with teachers'
unions.'35 The Deputy Secretary of Education, Eugene Hickok, wrote that
new contracts must not circumvent the school improvement mandates of
the law. "He cited language from a report by the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce saying that
the committee 'expects and encourages' new contracts 'to be consistent'
with [NCLB], especially the sections that outline steps to be taken when a
school is put into 'corrective action' or restructured."' 136 Former Secretary
of Education Paige expressed similar sentiments, writing in a "Dear
Colleague" letter that:
Section 1116 does not operate to invalidate employee protections
that exist under current law and collective bargaining and similar
labor agreements. However, it does not exempt state education
agencies, local education agencies, and schools from compliance
with Title I based on prospective collective bargaining or similar
agreements or changes in state or local law.'37
While these statements by government officials seem to imply that
newly negotiated teacher contracts must be compliant with NCLB, the
unions have taken the position that these amount to recommendations and
that the school districts are not bound to include language permitting the
restructuring provisions to prevail. 38 Therefore, the comments amount to
guidance rather than a mandate. Unions would be reluctant to agree to a
contract provision that allowed for the dismissal of teachers based on
student performance. On the other side of the negotiating table, the school
district will be in a weak position to demand such a provision given that
their hands are not bound by the law or regulations.
134. Gewertz, supra note 132.
135. Id. (quoting Eugene W. Hickok, the Deputy Secretary of Education).
136. Id.
137. Letter from Roderick Paige, U.S. Secretary of Education, Key Policy Letters Signed
by the Education Secretary or Deputy Secretary (June 14, 2002), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/020614.html (last visited April 10, 2006).
138. Gewertz, supra note 132.
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V. CONCLUSION
Though major education reform efforts have gained ground at the state
and federal levels in the past two decades since the release of A Nation at
Risk, it remains unclear if these statutory provisions will have their desired
effects due to collective bargaining agreements between teachers and the
school districts. The teachers' unions secured their spot at the negotiating
table and will continue to organize in order to protect the rights of teachers.
Voucher programs, charter school laws, and NCLB may all face challenges
based on their inherent conflicts with teacher contracts. As new contracts
are negotiated after the passage of reform legislation, negotiators for the
school district and for teachers will have to account for the changing
educational environment. Whether efforts to create a market-place for
education will be successful hinges on the teacher contracts:
Teachers remain the key people educating our children. As long
as competition from charter schools, privatized school
management, and voucher programs continues to put pressure on
public education and public school teachers continue to seek and
embrace union representation, collective bargaining will remain a
force for managing and directing change. 39
139. Allan W. Drachman, Collective Bargaining in Public Education, in SCHOOL LAW IN
MASSACHUSETTS, § 4.18 (2003).
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